Abstract of “The Concept of ‘State’ from Islamic Perspective”

Abstract of “The Concept of ‘State’ from Islamic Perspective” for 2nd INTERNATIONAL ISAR SYMPOSIUM with a Special Focus on State: Between Tradition and Future Dr. Hassan Ko Nakata The concept of ‘state’ which has become prevalent all over the world today because of the hegemony of its advocator, the West, that had once conquered the world by its imperialistic rule, stems from the experience historically specific to the modern West. It is characterized by two ideas, namely, ‘legal body’, and ‘representation’, both of which are product of Euro-Christian metaphysical tradition. The Western concept of ‘legal body’ has its root in the Christian terminology of ‘CORPUS CHRISTI’ from which the word ‘corporation’ comes, while the concept of ‘representation’ has echoes of Platonic ontology. Consequently it has connotation that the legal body is not an abstract concept which exists only in human mind but an entity which has a metaphysical reality. As for the modern concept of ‘nation state’ as legal body or corporation, what is represented by it is ‘the nation’ which is supposed to have the sovereignty. On the contrary, in the tradition of Islamic political thought, there is neither the concept of ‘legal body’ nor the concept of ‘representation. In Islam, only the ‘natural person’ can be an agent for the legal actions which result in the sanctions at the Day of Judgment, thus there is categorically no room for the concept of legal body. In Islam, the rulers can’t represent the people, but they can only act in behalf of the people according to the authorities which were conferred by Allah. Thus we should replace the concept of ‘state’ by another authentic term of Islamic sciences.

" “Memorandum for the knowledge of ‘Aqīdah required for Muslims in Japan"

2012/6/12, Tokyo International Institute of Islamic Thought’s Workshop on "Acculturation of Muslims into Japanese Society – ‘Aqīdah, Fiqh, Social Relations" “Memorandum for the knowledge of ‘Aqīdah required for Muslims in Japan" Hassan Ko Nakata ‘Aqīdah is a summarized creed for Muslims to believe. Muslims living in non-Islamic society such as Japan, in which the elementary axioms of Islam are not shared and questioned normally, should understand objectively the “credibility structure”. As for the relationship between "revelation and reason" on which the ‘Aqīdah is built, the reason in the sense of "language proficiency to the degree that one can perform with it the day-to-day social life without any problems" is a prerequisite for the revelation sent down to mankind. In other words, it means that human beings are able to live everyday life in this world to the extent that they can live without any problems as well as other animals, even if there is no revelation, consequently there is no need of the revelation for the daily life. The significance of the revelation is for the salvation in the Hereafter beyond the day-to-day life at first, then, for the better life. Though the reason of the ordinary human beings is enough for day-to-day world life but is neither able to know the afterlife nor able to understand the social order the optimal social order at that time. Therefore, the purpose of the dispatch of the Apostles and the revelation is to teach the optimal social order and the afterlife. Then, is it possible to know the "rightness" of the revelation. It is not possible to prove the "rightness" of the revelation by that revelation itself of, because it is a circular argument. And from the standpoint that the correctness of the revelation can be reduced to a value-neutral fact, as far as the revelation speaks of the hereafter, the correctness of the revelation can’t be proven in "strong sense” strictly. The Islamic sciences’ tradition does not distinguish between the practical reason for value judgments and the pure reason for factual judgments, consequently, it considers we can discern the good from the evil by the reason, namely, the reason is capable of value judgments. The revelation is narrative knowledge, a kind of acquisitive knowledge. From this standpoint, the correctness of the revelation is rather only proved by the reason in “weak sense” by "failure of demonstration of the falseness of the revelation”, "proof of probability" of the good life promised by Islam by the reason, and the 4 conditions of the Apostles, (1)wisdom,(2)honesty, (3)reliability, the credibility of the speaker, which are the conditions for the correctness of the narrative knowledge. In addition, in the life time of the Apostles, the correctness of the revelation is proven by the miracles(Mu‘jizah) which give a glimpse of the existence of the unseen afterlife beyond your reason, but after the death of the Apostle Muhammadﷺ, the revelation and the miracles which prove its correctness have finished, from the Sunni standpoint, though the infallibility of the community, Ummah, has inherited the infallibility of the Apostleﷺ, thus only the “weak proofs” by the reason" in principle have remained and the miracles and the credibility of the Apostles have become subject of the historical research, and the revelation proved by the reason “in weak sense” in principle has also, as a text, become the subject of the historiography or philology, consequently the correctness of the revelation has come to be not understandable except to academicians of the classical literature. The analysis of the credibility structure of the Muslims clarifies that the common believers except masters of all the Islamic sciences is just "blindly" following not the infallible Apostle, but words of fallible Muslims and non-Muslims without any historiographical investigation. Even if the "blind faith" would be allowed for Muslim himself, imposing his blind faith on the others is never allowed. Then, what Muslim can talk about Islam? The traditional Islamic sciences distinguish in the revelation (Qur'an and Sunnah), what can be known solely by the reason (in weak sense) (Tawfīqīyah) from what is not known solely by the reason but known only by the revelation(Tawqīfīyah). An example of what is known by the reason (Tawfīqīyah) is the first phrase of the confession of faith, "No god(which is worth being worshiped) but Allah" and an example of what is not known by the reason but known only by the revelation (Tawfīqīyah) and now is the subject of historiographical research is the second phrase of the confession of faith, "Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah". Islam means “obedience to Allah”, however "Islam" in the sense of a positive religion, it means “obedience to the Apostle Muhammadﷺ. As far as Islam means, obedience, the most serious problem for the Islam should be the issue of wilāyah or authority, i.e., whom or what Muslim should follow? "Follow Allah and follow the Apostle and the authorities (Ulī al-Amr) among you" (Qur'an 4:59). Islam as the positive religion is historiographical(classical-philological) religion based on the teachings of the Apostle Muhammadﷺ.  What every Muslim must know is that what is able to be known without painstaking historiographical investigation, and consequently is obligatory for all the Muslims to know is that no god but Allah, the first phrase of the confession of Islam, i.e., nothing is to be worshiped except Allah. It means that the most required command for all the Muslims as the first priority is the very first Commandment of Islam, demanding nobody obedience(blind following), namely, imposing nothing on anyone. If a doubt or question about teaching of Islam occurred to a Muslim or conflicts of opinions happened among Muslims, what the Muslim should consider and refer is this first phrase of the confession of Islam, imposing nothing on anyone, which is the first Commandment of Islam. Therefore, in the era of the absence of the apostles, Islam should only be based on the strictly voluntary consent absolutely due to the personal credit. Muslim should not force the others to trust in (Muslims)themselves, rather it is obligatory for them to show actively that they are not believing in the Revelation itself but following blindly mere the “rumors” about it, thus they are not qualified to be trusted, not in the manner of the humility but objectively as the bitter fact. So if Muslims want to talk about Islam in these days, Islam in the Apostolic Makkah period, when Islam was preached without of institutional force to implement, serves a model in a sense. Islamic teaching In this Makkah era was focusing on good and evil, existence of the afterlife, the oneness of Allah as the founder of f the value and the lord of this world and the hereafter, justice, generosity, and helping the weak. In Islam Madanī, contrary to Islam Makkī, , apparatus of physical violence were made to implement so called Islamic laws, then there appeared embracing Islam by a kind of force with the threat for the violence on its backdrop, and occurred the appearance of the Munāfiq, “false Muslim”, a chronic disease of Islam.   This Islam Makkī should be referred in the contemporary world, however there is a fatal and essential difference between Islam Makkī and the contemporary situation of Islamic Ummah.. Namely, in Makkī Islam indeed there was no apparatus of enforcing power in but there was the final resort, the absolute authority for the believers about what is Islam, which is Muhammad ﷺ the Prophet e, on the other hand, at the present time there is a false “Islamic” apparatus of violence which assumes the name of Islam while the true final authority to decide what is Islam. This is the problematic of the Caliph(Apostolic Successor) . Thus the first duty for the Muslims is to transform the contemporary fake Madanī Islam in which the unjust rulers assume the name of Islam in spite of the absence of the final authority to decide what is Islam to Makkī Islam which is lack of the apparatus of violence but based only on voluntary faith and confidence of the people, and after that we should reestablish the religious authority for Islam, then the political authority, i.e., the Caliphate. We can say that Japan, in which there is neither fake Islamic religious authority nor illegitimate Islamic political authority, is rather a suitable place to destroy the fake Islam which threatens the people by punishment in this world and the hereafter. Because those who was born and have grown up in Dār al-Ḥarb, House of War, and embrace Islam is exempted from the duty of observance of the Revealed Law which is the subject of the historiographical research, thus it is easier for them to reconstruct Islam through voluntary learning and consent not by incorrect motives as blind faith in the fake authority, fear of them, and restraint from them. For return to the Makkī Islam which is based solely on the voluntary faith and obedience due to the lack of the apparatus of violence to enforce Islam to revive the true Islamic religious authority, the historiograpal and philological effort which might be called “Salafistic” is necessary, however the ultimate criterion is its personality as the representative of the Apostle of Allah ﷺ. In the traditional Islamic sciences, the Sufism has been in charge of the cultivation of the personality as the representative of the Apostle. However, in our time in which the final authority of Islam is absent, Sufi’s self-claim for the authoritative knowledge of the unseen which ordinary people cannot judge its authenticity should be rejected categorically, because it contradicts Islam’s first Commandment. Sufism required now is, so to speak, Sufism oppressing Sufism, namely, Sufism which is deprived of all kinds of authority and is not protected except by Allah alone. And only if this religious authority would be revived, and all the Muslims get acquainted with Islamic knowledge, the Caliphate would be reestablished and the Muslims would restore their honorable position as "the best community which has appeared for the human race" (Qur’an 3: 110) responsible for the mission that they liberate the human beings and the earth from the domination of the idol gods of “territorial nation states”.  

「日本のムスリムに求められるアキーダ（信条）の知識」覚書 （２０１２年６月１２日 国際イスラーム思想研究所東京ワークショップ発表に基づく）

アキーダ（信条）とはムスリムが信ずるべき内容を纏めた綱要であるが、日本のようなアキーダが依って立つ基本公理を共有せず、不断に疑問を突きつける非イスラーム社会に生きるムスリムは、「イスラームの信憑構造」を客観的に把握する必要がある。 アキーダの公理となる「理性と啓示」の関係に関して、人類が「日常の社会生活が支障なく送れる程度の言語運用能力」という意味での理性を有することは、人類に啓示が下されるにあたっての前提条件となる。それはつまり、人類は他の動物と同じく啓示がなくとも現世での日常生活は支障なく送れる程度には生きていける、つまり日常生活に啓示は必要ではないことを意味する。 従って啓示の意義は先ず日常を超えた生活（来世）の救済のためであり、ついで、「よりよき」良き生活のためである。普通の人間の有する理性は、それだけでは日常の世界生活が支障なく送れる程度の知識を得ることは出来ても、来世を知り、その時点において最適な社会秩序を見通す、ことはできない。啓示と使徒の派遣の目的は来世と社会秩序を教えることにある。 それでは啓示の「正しさ」を知ることはできるだろうか。啓示によって啓示の「正しさ」は、循環論法に陥るため証明できない。また啓示が理性によって知り得ない「来世」のことを語る以上、啓示の正しさが価値中立的な事実的な真偽に還元できるとの立場からは、理性によって啓示の真理性を厳密な「強い意味」において証明することはできない。 事実判断の純粋理性と価値判断の実践理性を区別せず、理性は価値判断の真偽、即ち善悪を判断できる、と考える伝統イスラーム学の立場からは、啓示はアプリオリに正しい必然知ではなく獲得知の一種である伝聞知であり、啓示の正しさは、理性による「偽の証明の不成立」とイスラームのもたらす良き生の「蓋然性の証明」と、伝聞知の「正しさ」の条件である話者の信憑性に基づく使徒の四条件、（１）賢慮、（２）正直、（３）信頼性、（４）真理の秘匿をしない、という意味での情報公開、によって保証される。更に、使徒の在世中は、啓示の正しさは、理性の及ばない来世、幽玄界の存在を垣間見させるものとしての奇跡によって啓示の正しさが証明されるが、スンナ派の立場からは使徒ムハンマドの逝去後は使徒の無謬性をウンマ（共同体）の無謬性が受け継ぐが、啓示は途絶えると考えられるため、原理的に「理性による弱い証明」だけが残り、使徒の信憑性と奇跡は歴史学の研究の対象となり、原理的に「理性による弱い証明」が成立している啓示もテキストとして、歴史学（古典文献学）の対象になり、古典文献学者以外には、啓示の「正しさ」は理解できない。 翻って、ムスリムの信憑性構造を分析すると、イスラーム学の全てに通じた碩学を除く信徒は、無謬の預言者ならぬムスリム、非ムスリムの言葉を歴史学的考証もせずに「盲信」していることが明らかになる。 ムスリムは自らが「盲信」することが許されているとしても、他者にその盲信を押しつけることは許されない。それではムスリムはイスラームについて何を語りうるのか。 伝統イスラーム学は、啓示（クルアーンとスンナ）の中にも、理性のみによってその（弱い意味での）真理性を知りうるもの(tawfīqīyah)と、理性のみによってはその真理性が知られず啓示によってのみその正しさが明かされるもの(tawqīfīyah)を区別してきた。 理性によって真理性を知りうるもの(tawfīqīyah)の例としては、信仰告白の第一段、「神（崇拝対象）なし。アッラーを除く」が挙げられ、理性のみによってはその真理性が知られず啓示によってのみその正しさが明かされるもの、即ち現時点では歴史学の研究対象となるもの例としては、信仰告白の第二段、「ムハンマドはアッラーの使徒」が挙げられる。 それゆえ理念的には「イスラーム」とはアッラーへの帰依を意味するとしても、実定宗教としてのイスラームとは使徒ムハンマドﷺへの帰依を意味することとなる。 「イスラーム」とはその語義において、帰依、絶対服従である以上、イスラームにとっての最重要問題は、誰、あるいは何が権威であるのか、従うべきか、との権威・代理権(wilāyah)の問題。「アッラーと使徒と権威者(ulī al-amr)に従え」（クルアーン４章５９節）。 歴史上の人物である使徒ムハンマドﷺの教えに基づく実定宗教としてのイスラームは歴史学（古典文献学）的宗教であり、ムスリムが必ず知っていなければならないことは、歴史学的考証を経ずして知り得、それ故に万人が知りうることはイスラームの信仰告白の第一段「神（崇拝対象）なし。アッラーを除く。」であり、正にイスラームの最も基底となる教えが、誰にも崇拝を要求しないこと、つまり誰にも何事も押しつけないことだということである。ムスリムがイスラームの教えについて疑問が生じた時、あるいはムスリム同士で見解の対立が生じた時に還るべきは、この信仰告白の第一段であり、誰にも何物をも押しつけない、とのイスラームの根本原則、第一戒なのである。 従って使徒無き時代にあってのイスラームは、あくまでも信用に基づく自発的同意のみによらねべならない。ムスリムは自分を信用することを決して押しつけてはならず、むしろ謙遜では無く客観的事実として強い意味で自分たちが啓示そのものでは無くそれについての「噂」を盲信しているに過ぎず、信用される資格がないことを積極的に示す義務がある。 それ故、現在のムスリムがイスラームを語る場合に、現世においてイスラームを執行する暴力装置による強制力なしにイスラームが説かれたマッカ期の宣教がある意味でモデルとなる。マッカの宣教は、善悪、来世の存在、現世来世の主、価値定立者としてのアッラーの唯一性、正義、寛大、弱者の援助などの教えであった。このマッカ期のイスラームと対比されるモデルとしてのマディーナ期のイスラームには、所謂「法的規定」の施行のための暴力装置が形成され、その威嚇を背景とした一種の強制によるイスラームへの入信が現れ、「偽信者」の発生というイスラームの宿痾が生じた。 マッカ期のイスラームは現代において参考とすべきだが、マッカ期と現代では決定的な本質的相違が存在する。 つまり、マッカ期には、強制力を有する暴力装置は存在しなかったが、イスラームが何かについては信徒にとっての唯一の絶対的な権威、最終審級（預言者ムハンマドﷺ）が存在したのに対して、現代においては最終審級が不在である一方で、イスラームの名を騙り強制する暴力装置が存在しえいるということである。これがカリフ問題である。 現代におけるムスリムの最初の課題は、イスラームが何であるのかを決める最終審級が存在しないにもかかわらず、イスラームの名を騙り、現世と来世における威嚇によって人を支配する者たちによる「似非マディーナ期のイスラーム」を、イスラームを強制する暴力装置は欠き、自発的信仰のみに基づくマッカ期のイスラームに戻すことであり、次いでイスラームの最終審級たる宗教的権威、そしてそのイスラームを強制執行する政治的権威の再確立、つまりカリフ制の再興となる。 イスラームの名を騙る現世と来世における威嚇による似非イスラームの打破において、イスラームの似非の宗教的権威も政治的権威も存在しない日本は、むしろ恵まれた立場にあると言うことも出来る。なぜならば、イスラームの権威が不在の地「戦争の家」に生まれ育ってイスラームに入信した者は、歴史学的考証の対象である啓示法の遵守義務を免じられているので（注）、似非権威に対する盲信、恐怖、遠慮などの不純な動機によらず、自発的な学びと納得のみによってイスラームを再構築することが容易だからである。 イスラームを強制する暴力装置は欠き、自発的信仰のみに基づくマッカ期のイスラームに戻すことであり 宗教的権威の再興には、サラフィー主義的とも言うべき歴史学、古典文献学的作業が不可欠であるが、しかし究極の基準はアッラーの使徒ﷺの代理人に相応しい人格性である。そしてこの使徒の代理人たる人格性の涵養はイスラーム学の伝統の中ではスーフィズムが担ってきた。しかし、イスラームの最終審級たる権威が不在である現代において、常人には真偽を判断できない幽玄界の知識を自称するスーフィーの権威要求は、「誰にも何ものも押しつけない」とのイスラームの第一戒への侵犯として峻拒退されなくてはならない。現在求められるスーフィズムは、言うならばスーフィズムを弾圧するスーフィズム、つまり地上の権威を一切纏わずただアッラーのみ以外に何物にも護られることのないスーフィズムなのである。 そしてこの宗教的権威が再興され、ムスリム大衆がイスラームの学知に目覚め、カリフ制再興の義務がムスリム大衆の共通理解となった時、 カリフ制が再興され、ムスリムは人類と大地を偶像神の支配から解放する、という使命を担う「人類の中に出現した最善の共同体」（クルアーン３章１１０節）の名誉ある地位を回復するのである。 注 アル＝ナーブルスィー曰く。「二人の使徒の間の中間時の民の行為には、彼らの時代には宣教が成立しないので罪はない。人々から隔絶した地に育った、あるいは『戦争の家』でイスラームに入信し「『イスラームの家』に移住しなかった者も同様である。但し、これれは全て身体行為についてであり、アッラーへの不信の罪については誰もそれについて免責されない。なぜならば理性がその認識については十分だからである。アッラーはそれ（理性）を全ての人間に導き手として遣わし給うたのである。但し、（アッラーが）地平線と自分自身の中に彼を示すものとして設けられた彼の様々な徴や証拠について彼に対する考察が有効に成立したとの条件においてである。」 وأهل الفترة بين كل رسولين ليس في أعمالهم ذنوب لعدم حصول التبليغ في زمانهم كذلك من نشأ في مكان منقطع عن الناس أو أسلم في دار الحرب ولم يهاجر إلى دار الإسلام وهذا كله في أعمال الجوارح. وأما ذنب الكفر بالله فلا يعذر فيه أحد. لأن العقل كاف في معرفة ذلك. فالله تعالى بعثه إلى كل إنسان هاديا بشرط صحة النظر به في آياته وحججه التي نصبها دالة عليه في الآفاق والأنفس. (عبد الغني النابلسي, حقائق الإسلام وأسراره, القاهرة, 1986,ص.31)

“Reconstruction of Concept of Ṣulḥ as Diplomatic Tool”

2013/03/18 　Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi Medeniyetler İttifakı Enstitüsünde Enstitü “Reconstruction of Concept of Ṣulḥ as Diplomatic Tool” Dr. Hassan Ko Nakata (Doshisha University) Introduction In this presentation, first we clarify that the term “ṣulḥ” has two different meanings in diplomatic context, and then we argue that both meanings of “ṣulḥ” are very useful for the contemporary Muslim ummah. 1. Definition of Ṣulḥ The most voluminous encyclopaedia of Islamic jurisprudence classify ṣulḥ into 5 kinds as bellow. أحدهما : الصّلح بين المسلمين والكفّار. والثّاني : الصّلح بين أهل العدل وأهل البغي . والثّالث : الصّلح بين الزّوجين إذا خيف الشّقاق بينهما ، أو خافت الزّوجة إعراض الزّوج عنها. والرّابع : الصّلح بين المتخاصمين في غير مال . كما في جنايات العمد. والخامس : الصّلح بين المتخاصمين في الأموال. (الموسوعة الفقهية) And it is said that the first kind of ṣulḥ is synonymous with ʽahd and hudnah, and Muslim jurists of the major 4 schools define hudnah or ṣulḥ in similar formula, for example. قال الحنفية: هي الصلح على ترك القتال مدة بمال أو بغير مال إذا رأى الإمام مصلحة في ذلك. (الموسوعة الفقهية) But this definition has a fatal defect because it does not cover one of the most important usages, i.e., ṣulḥ by which Muslims conquest the land of the Non-Muslims, Tanwīr al-Abṣār says, ما فتح عنوة وأقر أهله عليه أو صلحا خراجية. We can define ṣulḥ of this meaning as “reconciliation in which conditions of Muslim conquest of Non-Muslims’ land and its integration into dār al-islām are agreed by both sides in addition to payment of jizyah tax. This type of ṣulḥ is different from the first kind of ṣulḥ categorically. Dr.Muḥammad Khair Haylal pointed out that this first kind of ṣulḥ is not the above difined ṣulḥ, saying; هذا الصلح لا يقتضي دفع الجزية من قبل البلاد المحاربة ولا خضوعها للنظام الإسلامي ولا السماح للدعوة الإسلامية فيها بالانتشار والكف عن إيذاء المؤمنين بها من رعاياهم. (الجهاد والقتال في السياسة الشرعية, ج.3 ص.1493) So, we call the former ṣulḥ With “ṣulḥ of truce” and the later one “ṣulḥ of conquest”. 2. Dār al-Islam and Dār al-Ḥarb With “ṣulḥ of truce” Non-Muslims’ land remains dār al-ḥarb, while with “ṣulḥ of conquest” it becomes dār al-Islām. This differentiation is worth mentioning here because nowadays there are confusions of usage of ṣulḥ among Muslim scholars and intellectuals and some of them claim that there is the third category of dār, i.e., dār al-ṣulḥ,beside dār al-Islām and dār al-ḥarb ”, independent from these both dārs. But the truth is that there is only dār al-Islām into which Non-Muslims’ land is integrated by “ṣulḥ of conquest” and dār al-ḥarb, part of which has “ṣulḥ of truce” It seems that both of these concepts of ṣulḥ are useful for our ummah to adapt itself to the contemporary world, in which there is neither legitimate Islamic polity, i.e. khilāfah, nor Islamic territory which is governed by sharīʽah, dār Islām. Dr. Haykal defines the concept of dār al-Islām after citing Hanafi definition. دار الكفر تصير دار الإسلام بظهور أحكام الإسلام فيها واختلفوا في دار السلام أنها تصير دار الكفر؟ قال أبو حنيفة أنها تصير دار الكفر إلا بثلاث شرائط أحدها ظهور أحكام الكفر فيه والثاني أن متاخمة لدار الكفر والثالث أن لا يبقى فيها مسلم ولا ذمي آمنا بالأمان الأول وهو أمان المسلمين وقال أبو يوسف ومحمد رحمهما الله أنها تصير دار الكفر بظهور أحكام فيها. …دار اللإسلام هي البلاد التي يكون فيها هو النظام الإسلامي وفي نفس الوقت يكون الأمن الداخلي والخارجي فيها هو بيد المسلمين. (بضائع الصنائع,ج.7.ص.130),ج.1,ص.662-669. 3. Absence of Khilāfah and “Ṣulḥ of Truce” Ummah has neither Islamic political power, i.e., khilāfah, nor sharīʽah governed space, dār al-islām. And according to the majority of Muslim jurists, the contract of the “ṣulḥ of the truce” is the prerogative of the khalīfah (and his deputy) as only the khalīfah can conclude the pact of ṣulḥ and contract of dhimmah, however Hanafi jurists consider any Muslim group can conclude ṣulḥ if it is profitable for them without permission from the khalīfah. يرى جمهور الفقهاء أن يكون العاقد للهدنة هو الإمام أو نائبه. ... الرأى الثاني للحنفية وهو أنه لا يشترط إذن الإمام للموادعة فيجوز عقد الموادعة لفريق من المسلمين ... لأن المعول عليه وجود المصلحة في عقدها فحيث وجدت جازت. (الموسوعة الفقهية) Actually, there is hardly essential difference between the majority’s view on the ṣulḥ and the Hanafi’s one, because from the standpoint of Hanafi school, the contract of the ṣulḥ of the truce is jā’is, voidable, thus the khalīfah can cancel the ṣulḥ which is concluded by a certain group of Muslims if he finds benefit in its cancelation, thus the khalīfah is the final authority to confirm the ṣulḥ. وذهب الحنفية إلى أن عقد الهدنة غير لازم محتمل للنقض فللإمام نبذه إليهم فإن رأى الإمام أن في الموادعة خيرا للمسلمين فوادعهم ثم نظر فوجد أنها شر على المسلمين نبذ إليهم. (الموسوعة الفقهية) As for the ṣulḥ of truce, it is permissible to pay tribute to enemy states in case of weakness of Muslims. Thus nowadays local Muslim governments can conclude the pacts of ṣulḥ tentatively with neighboring countries to avoid the loss of the life and property of Muslims because of their weakness until the legitimate Islamic state, i.e., khilāfah, came into existence to examine these pacts whether to confirm or to cancel. 4. Khilāfah and “Ṣulḥ of Conquest” While the Islamically illegitimate local governments maintains mundane order of Muslims in the former dār al-Islām, Ummah should struggle for reestablish khilafah and dār al-Islām, but since all the Muslims’ lands have once become dār al-ḥarb, the new dār al-Islām should be rebuilt after clearance of the old dār al-Islām. Islamic jurisprudence classifies dār al-Islām into the land conquered by ‘unwah(war) and the land conqured by ṣulḥ (reconciliation). Nowadays it seems quite unlikely that the ummah would conquer the lands by war again. Therefore the coming new dār al-Islām will be based on ṣulḥ newly contracted. While building of a new church is no allowed in the land which is conquered by ‘unwah, it is permissible to build a new church if the ṣulḥ contains its permission. In the ‘unwah conquered land, many restrictions are imposed on Non-Muslims after the model of ṣulḥ of ‘Umar’s conquest of Jerusalem. For example, building of new church is not allowed in ‘unwah conquered land, but it is permitted if ṣulḥ of conquest is concluded on the condition that they may build a new church in their territory.(Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol., 13, pp.241-242) 5. Conclusion We believe that the khilāfah and the dār al-Islām are attractive not only to Muslims but also to Non-Muslims only if they are understood properly because they guarantee the true freedom and autonomy for the various ethnic and religious communities with justice. Thus, we can duly anticipate that many Non-Muslims dominating lands will be integrated to the new dār al-Islām under the coming khilāfah through voluntary conclusion of ṣulḥ of conquest. So, the ummah is responsible for preparing drafts of ṣulḥ which is not only in accordance with sharī‘ah, but acceptable to Non-Muslims who are accustomed to living in the illusion of the Western “human rights” and “democracy” for the sake of peaceful coexistence of the Muslim ummah and the outer world. And this task is an indispensable part of process of reestablishing the khilāfah and the dār al-Islām. (1) (1) As for the concept of “khilāfah”, see, Hassan Ko Nakata, "The deconstruction of Sunnite Theory of Caliphate: Spreading the Rule of Law on the Earth", Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (JISMOR) 6 / March 2011, pp.67-86. (http://www.cismor.jp/en/publication/jismor/documents/nakata6E.pdf)

تحريف أحكام الجهاد للأزهر

ﻛﺘﺐ ﺷﻴﺦ ﺍﻷ‌ﺯﻫﺮ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻃﻨﻄﺎﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﻴﺴﺮ، هو ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺮﺭ ﻟﻠﻔﻘﻪ ﻟﻠﺼﻒ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻬﺪ ﺍﻹ‌ﻋﺪﺍﺩﻱ، ﻭﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩ: (ﺗﻌﺭﻳفه ﺷﺮعا) ﺑﺬﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺎﻝ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﺇﻋﻼ‌ﺀ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻭﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﺍﻟﺪﻓﺎﻉ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻭﺍﻟﻮﻃﻦ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺎﻝ ... يكون الجهاد فرض عين إذا داهم العدو أرض الوطن واستنفر ولي الأمر في الدولة جميع أفرادها من أجل أنفسهم.(اه) ولكن تعريف الجهاد شرعا أو اصطلاحا عند الجمهور "قتال الكفار لأجل إعلاء كلمة الله"، فيتقيد الجهاد بقتال الكفار فأخرج قتال البغاة وقطاع الطريق ولكن لا يتقيد بالدفاع. ولا يدخل "الوطن" فيما يجب الدفاع عنه إلا أنه من دار الإسلام. و يصبح الجهاد فرض عين (1) إذا هاجم العدو الكافر دار الإسلام لو لم يكن إذن من الإمام أي الخليفة أو(2) استنفر الإمام أو (3) التقيا الجيشان من المسلمين والكفار. كيف يكون القتال جهادا لو كان الوطن أرض لا يحكم فيها شرع الله أو حاكم الدولة كافر له واستنفر جميع المواطنين سواء كانوا مسلمين أوغيرهم لأجل دفاعها؟! هكذا خان شيخ الأزهر السابق علماء الشريعة القدماء وحرف أحكام الجهاد وأضل طلبة العلم. أرجو أن يعود الأزهر إلى أن يكون منار العلم بعد أن أصبح خادم الطواغيت، والله المستعان.